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Abstract
This paper is one of the first to use employer-employee data on wages and labor
productivity to measure discrimination against immigrants. We build on an
identification strategy proposed by Bartolucci (Ind Labor Relat Rev 67(4):1166–1202,
2014) and address firm fixed effects and endogeneity issues through a diff GMM-IV
estimator. Our models also test for gender-based discrimination. Empirical results for
Belgium suggest significant wage discrimination against women and (to a lesser
extent) against immigrants. We find no evidence for double discrimination against
female immigrants. Institutional factors such as firm-level collective bargaining and
smaller firm sizes are found to attenuate wage discrimination against foreigners, but
not against women.
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1 Introduction
Immigration flows into OECD countries are marked by both sharp fluctuations and
considerable diversity between countries. Taken all countries together, however, net
immigration has been consistently positive since the 1960s. The first decade of the
new century witnessed a new surge of inflows: between early 2000 and late 2010, the
stock of foreign-born residents in the OECD rose by around 35 % from 75 million to
100 million (OECD 2014, p. 1). In 2011, foreign-born individuals represented less than
10 % in most Eastern European countries, Greece and Portugal; between 10 and 20 %
in the rest of the European Union and the USA (14.9 % in Belgium); and more than
20 % in Australia, Canada, Luxembourg and Switzerland (OECD 2014).
In this paper, we are concerned with the relationship between the employment of im-
migrants and wages, a field of intense empirical and theoretical research in labor eco-
nomics since the 1950s (Becker 1957; Chiswick 1978; Arrow 1998; Altonji and Blank
1999; Arai and Thoursie 2009; Baert and Cockx 2013; Baert and De Pauw 2014; Baert et
al. 2014, 2015). The empirical research in this area is marked by the observation that on
average foreign workers with comparable productivity-related characteristics than natives
receive lower wages (Bevelander and Veenman 2008; Chiswick et al. 2008; Meurs and
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Pailhe 2010; Barrett et al. 2012; McGuinness and Byrne 2014; Arai et al. 2015). The rele-
vance of this relationship partly stems from its connection to a series of distributional is-
sues and especially concerns about discrimination and retributive justice. It is also related
to other policy debates on immigration, for instance whether countries with wage penal-
ties fail to attract skilled foreign labor or whether the labor supply increase due to immi-
gration exerts downward pressure on native wages.
Wages of immigrants have been studied at different levels: individual Mincer-type re-
gressions, but also cities, regions and countries have been the most popular levels of
analysis (Borjas and Katz 2007; Arai and Nekby 2007; Arai and Thoursie 2009; Meurs
and Pailhe 2010; Dustmann et al. 2013; Mitaritonna et al. 2014; Simon et al. 2014; Arai
et al. 2015). While studying wage discrimination at these levels is often justified on em-
pirical and theoretical grounds (Ottaviano and Peri 2012), they are unable to capture
appropriately the most important explanans in economic wage theory: labor productiv-
ity. Arguing that the latter depends to a large extent on the immediate context in which
the employee operates—How much capital is at her disposition? How qualified are her
co-workers? What type of technology does the firm use? etc.—a small strand of the lit-
erature started to explore wage discrimination against immigrants with firm-level data
(Hellerstein et al. 1999; Aydemir and Skuterud 2008).
Our paper adds to the literature that consists of the few existing studies that measure
wage discrimination against immigrants while accounting directly for productivity effects at
the firm level. First, we apply a very recent approach to estimating firm-level wage discrim-
ination against immigrants developed by Bartolucci (2014); we are the first to estimate these
effects with a large matched employer-employee dataset covering the Belgian labor market,
a country that is generally considered as having comparatively strong anti-discrimination le-
gislation. Second, we address various econometric issues neglected in previous studies such
as the potential endogeneity of foreign workers and unobserved time-invariant firm charac-
teristics (we present both FE and GMM-IV estimators). Third, we improve on firm-level
studies that focus only on male migrants and study the respective wage effects of the em-
ployment of male natives, female natives, male immigrants and female immigrants. Fourth,
we test additional hypotheses on whether wage discrimination against foreigners is affected
by the level of collective bargaining and firm size.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on wage dis-
crimination against immigrants and discusses three potential sources of productivity
differences between natives and immigrants. Section 3 presents our methodological ap-
proach for measuring the relationship between foreign employment, on the one hand,
and average wages at the firm level on the other hand. Section 4 presents our dataset
and descriptive statistics, whereas Section 5 includes the results of our regression ana-
lysis that are discussed in the concluding Section 6.
2 Literature review
2.1 Wage discrimination
The conventional definition of wage discrimination in labor economics is inseparably
linked to the notion of productivity. According to the definition of Heckman (1998),
wage discrimination corresponds to a situation in which an employer pays a different
wage to two otherwise identical individuals but who differ with respect to a characteristic
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such as gender or race—with the crucial qualification that these characteristics have no
direct effect on productivity.
A mismatch between wage gaps and productivity gaps may arise for different rea-
sons, the classical explanations provided by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) being
“statistical discrimination” and “preference-based discrimination”. The first theory
refers to the effect of negative stereotypes or a general lack of information of em-
ployers on the productivity of immigrants, a situation that can turn into a “self-ful-
filling prophecy” if it decreases the expected returns on human capital investments
made by immigrants. In other words, due to employer beliefs or the limited trans-
ferability of credentials, immigrants may be penalized for difficulties in signaling
their productivity. The second theory refers to a situation in which the tastes of
employers (or their employees or customers) translate into lower demand and
lower wages for foreign workers. A third theory on wage discrimination relates to
differences in career dynamics, for instance if self-selection and self-censorship
leads to immigrants behaving differently from native colleagues with identical prod-
uctivity (Duguet et al. 2010, p. 7). These different mechanisms can be associated to
the attributes of both being female and being foreign, so that female immigrants
might cumulate wage penalties (“double discrimination”).
Starting from these premises, it is obvious that empirical research needs data on
wages but also on productivity to be able to assert the presence of discrimination
against (female) immigrants. Recent advances in empirical research have provided at
least three types of plausible explanations for why immigrants affect productivity differ-
ently than natives. These explanations can be divided into intrinsic productivity differ-
ences and segregation into groups with different productivity.
2.2 Sources for productivity differentials
2.2.1 Intrinsic productivity differences
Intrinsic productivity differences refer to the value of the human capital or ability of
immigrants. They have been documented in studies on the language abilities of immi-
grants (Dustmann and van Soest 2002; Hellerstein and Neumark 2003), literacy skills
(Ferrer et al. 2006) or the quality and transferability of foreign education and training
(Bratsberg and Ragan 2002).
According to Friedberg (2000, p. 221), education and labor market experience ac-
quired abroad are less valued than domestically acquired human capital. According to
his study on the Israeli labor market, this difference can fully account for the wage pen-
alty of immigrants compared to natives with similar characteristics. Bratsberg and
Ragan (2002, p. 63) document a link between wage penalties and foreign education for
the USA. Their study suggests that this effect is either due to the inadequacy of foreign
education or signaling problems and show that any additional schooling in the USA
“upgrades or certifies” the education previously acquired in the sending country. More
recently, found that education remains the most important explanations for wage dif-
ferentials between native and foreign workers in the French wage distribution. Results
in Dustmann and van Soest (2002) based on panel data from Germany show that lan-
guage proficiency is considerably more important than what is conventionally assumed
in the literature. A key result of this line of research is that a substantial portion of
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observed wage differentials is linked to intrinsic productivity differences, but also that
wage penalties could diminish over time if intrinsic differences taper out in the assimi-
lation process. A serious limitation of research in this area is that only few studies use
direct information on productivity and investigate gender biases in intrinsic productiv-
ity differentials between immigrants and natives (Hellerstein and Neumark 2006; Barto-
lucci 2014).
2.2.2 Segregation into categories with different productivity
A second source of productivity differences between natives and immigrants can be
subsumed under the concept of segregation, i.e. the non-random sorting into categories
with different productivity. The most common categories associated with segregation
include job types, tasks, occupational nomenclatures, firms with different technologies
or capital endowments and sectors of activity. Whereas intrinsic productivity effects
refer to differences between natives and immigrants within the same category (e.g. un-
equal productivity within the same occupation), segregation points to differences in the
distribution of natives and immigrants across categories that each capture a certain
level of productivity (e.g. overrepresentation of immigrants in occupations with lower
productivity).
Bayard et al. (1999) argue that large parts of the wage gap between whites and non-
whites in the USA can be attributed to different types of labor market segregation.
Elliott and Lindley (2008) conclude that occupational segregation contributes to
immigrant-native wage gaps in the UK. Similarly, find no wage discrimination but
modest occupational segregation in their matched employer-employee data from
France. Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) use Canadian matched employer-employee
data to document non-random sorting of immigrants into firms that pay lower
wages, an effect that appears to be stronger for immigrant men than for women.
Peri and Sparber (2008, p. 135) use US Census data from 1960–2000 to show that
foreign-born workers appear to specialize in manual and physically demanding oc-
cupations while natives sort into jobs requiring intensive communication and lan-
guage skills, which can be interpreted as sorting into jobs with different
productivity. Findings by Aslund and Skans (2010) suggest that path dependency
can explain part of heterogeneous sorting in Sweden as immigrants are more likely
to work in firms which already employ immigrants.
Although segregation does not fall under “wage discrimination” in the sense of Heckman’s
definition quoted above, recent research suggests that labor economists have over-
looked that segregation not necessarily “explains” observed wage differentials.
Firstly, studies using firm-level panel data on productivity conclude that it is not
clear to what extent categories such as occupations are actually accurate proxies
for productivity (Gottschalk 1978; Kampelmann and Rycx 2012). Indeed, none of
the studies cited above use direct measures of productivity and therefore have to
rely on more or less accurate proxies. Secondly, non-random sorting is hardly a
satisfying explanation but rather points to structural differences in terms of origin
or gender that call themselves for explanations. For instance, segregation raises
equity issues if immigrants are systematically “downgraded” into low-wage categor-
ies that lie below their observed skills, as suggested in recent work by Dustmann
et al. (2013) and McGuinness and Byrne (2014). As mentioned above, most
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available studies on gender or ethnic biases in segregation suffer from the absence
of direct productivity measures (Hellerstein and Neumark 2006; Bartolucci 2014).
Female immigrants are potentially exposed to both intrinsic productivity differences and
segregation into categories with lower productivity, again suggesting lower pay or, in the
case of wages below marginal products, a risk of “double discrimination” for this group.
2.2.3 Institutional factors
Wage discrimination against groups such as women or foreigners can be either exacerbated
or attenuated by institutional factors. In this context, different authors have hypothesized
that collective bargaining could diminish wage discrimination against minority groups
(Freeman 1980; Plasman et al. 2007). In many countries, including Belgium, trade unions
have presented themselves as advocates of “fair pay” for vulnerable groups (Dell’Aringa and
Lucifora 1994; ETUC 2014). One way to assess the role of collective bargaining on wage
discrimination is to use firm-level data for examining whether productivity-adjusted wage
effects related to foreigners are smaller in companies with firm-level collective bargaining
compared to those without firm-level agreements. In our dataset from Belgium, this hy-
pothesis can be tested by splitting the sample into (a) firms that are only covered by na-
tional- and sectoral-level bargaining and (b) firms that have an additional round of
bargaining at the firm level. According to the standard hypothesis on multi-level bargain-
ing, we expect that wage discrimination is more likely to occur in firms without firm-level
bargaining (Dell’Aringa et al. 2004; Plasman et al. 2007).
A second hypothesis associated with institutional factors relates to the role of firm size.
According to Lallemand and Rycx (2005), the wage bargaining process could be more
likely to allow for wage discrimination if firms are relatively small. The main argument for
this prediction is that larger firms tend to have more efficient and transparent human re-
source management, including clearly defined pay scales and job evaluation criteria. This
being said, the effect of firm size could also magnify discrimination due to a general ten-
dency that larger firms have been shown to be more unequal in terms of pay (Ferrer and
Lluis 2008). Moreover, larger firms generally have a larger range of occupational and job
categories that could make it easier to associate a specific group with a specific category
and pay scale. For example, the clustering of foreign workers in specially created low-pay
job categories in large companies has been documented for the case of Turkish immi-
grants in German car factories during the 1970s (Kampelmann 2011). Smaller firms typic-
ally have less detailed job nomenclatures so that minority groups are less likely to be
clustered in discriminated categories. In order to examine which of these mechanisms
predominates, we have estimated the effect of firm size by splitting the sample into firms
below and above the median firm size (which equals 57 workers in our dataset).
As for the preceding issues of intrinsic productivity differences and segregation, we
have tested the hypotheses regarding institutional factors with firm-level data from
Belgium that controls for productivity and a wide range of observable and non-
observable characteristics.
3 Measurement methods
3.1 Wage-setting equations at the firm level
Over several decades, the contributions by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) have pro-
vided the most commonly used tools for studying potential wage discrimination against
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immigrants. As a tool for disentangling productivity and wage discrimination, the
standard version of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition has attracted increasingly
sharp criticism (Hellerstein and Neumark 2006). First, by definition, the residual
gap confounds any unobserved intrinsic productivity differences or unobserved
sorting with discrimination. Second, the method controls for differences in occupa-
tional or sectoral composition between natives and immigrants rather than explain-
ing the process of sorting into groups with different productivity; it is therefore
prone to a “potential selectivity bias”. Third, the individual-level equations of the
Oaxaca-Blinder framework ignore productivity spillover effects that occur at the
level of the firm. The conclusion that Bartolucci (2014, p. 3) draws from this is
harsh: “As discrimination has normally been detected through the unexplained gap
in wage equations and this approach is not the best option for disentangling differ-
ences in productivity and discrimination, there are few papers that address labor
market discrimination against immigrants.”
The increasing availability of firm-level matched employer-employee data facilitated
the emergence of an alternative approach to measuring discrimination. The new
method has been developed by Hellerstein et al. (1999) and refined by Vandenberghe
(2011a, b) and van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011) among others. It has now become
standard in the literature regarding the productivity and wage effects of labor hetero-
geneity (Garnero et al. 2014a, b; Göbel and Zwick 2012; Vandenberghe 2013). It is
based on the separate estimation of an added-value function and a wage equation at
the firm level: the added-value function yields estimates for the average marginal prod-
uct of each category of workers (natives, immigrants, etc.), while the wage equation es-
timates the respective impact of each group on the average wage paid by the firm.
Estimating both equations with the same set of explanatory variables allows comparing
the parameters regarding the (average) marginal product and the (average) wage.
The Hellerstein-Neumark method captures compositional and sorting effects that are
ignored by the Oaxaca-Blinder framework; crucially, the productivity differences associ-
ated with observable characteristics are directly measured instead of being assumed.
However, these advantages often deliver potential rather than actual mileage: while the
firm-level wage setting equations in the Hellerstein-Neumark framework are generally
robust to different specifications and provide precise estimates, the identification of
the production function is often far more problematic due to high standard errors
and noise in the productivity measures (Göbel and Zwick 2012; Vandenberghe
2013). Bartolucci (2014, p. 9) argues that it is difficult to obtain precise estimates
of the relative productivity parameter. Indeed, the search for the appropriate form
of the production function is a long-standing theme in the micro-econometric lit-
erature (Olley and Pakes 1996; Petrin et al. 2004; Ackerberg et al. 2006). While
empirical studies focusing only on the firm-level productivity function are more
flexible in the choice of both the functional form and the statistical estimator, the
Hellerstein-Neumark method imposes a symmetry between both wage setting and
productivity equations in order to ensure the comparability of the respective pa-
rameters, which is why most studies use the simple CES or Cobb-Douglas form
and FE or GMM-IV estimators for both equations. The underlying problem is that
the compelling theoretical reasons to use Olley-Pakes or Levinson-Petrin estimators
for the production functions often lack a theoretical rationale in the case of wage
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equations. The fact that some firm-level studies on immigration estimate only
productivity functions (Nicodemo 2013; Paserman 2013) and others only wage
equations (Böheim et al. 2012) is a way to circumvent this issue but comes at the
price of renouncing from measuring wage discrimination.
In this paper, we build on a new solution developed by Bartolucci (2014) that (a)
avoids the specification of the functional form of the productivity equation but never-
theless directly uses firm-level productivity data to measure discrimination against im-
migrants; (b) neither assumes perfect competition in the labor market nor a linear
relationship between wages and productivity (it allows for non-unitary wage-
productivity elasticities); and (c) produces a measure of wage discrimination against im-
migrants that is robust to labor market segregation.1
The wage-setting equation proposed by Bartolucci is similar to the wage equation in
the Hellerstein-Neumark framework but directly estimates a parameter for the loga-
rithm of average firm-level productivity. The integration of measured productivity
yields the following wage equation:
log wj;t
  ¼ αj þ β log pj;t
 
þ γ Ij;t þ λXj;t þ εj;t ð1Þ
where the dependent variable log wj;t
 
is the logarithm of the average hourly wage in
firm j in year t; the variable log pj;t
 
is the logarithm of average hourly productivity; Ijt
is the proportion of immigrants and γ the parameter that captures wage discrimination;
Xjt is a vector containing a set of observable characteristics of firm j and its labor force
in year t. In addition to Eq. 1, we estimate a second equation that distinguishes between
the proportions of male immigrants, female immigrants and female natives (respect-
ively denoted as IMjt, IWjt and NWjt—male natives are the reference category):
log wj;t
  ¼ αj þ β log pj;t
 
þ γIM IMj;t þ γIW IWj;t þ γNW NWj;t þ λXj;t þ εj;t ð2Þ
3.2 Estimation methods
Equations 1 and 2 can be estimated using different methods. Basic pooled OLS estima-
tors of productivity models have been criticized for their potential “heterogeneity bias”
(Vandenberghe 2013) due to the fact that firm productivity and mean wages depend to
a large extent on firm-specific, time-invariant characteristics that are not measured in
micro-level surveys. As a consequence, these estimators might be biased since unob-
served firm characteristics may simultaneously affect the firm’s added value (or wage)
and the composition of its workforce.
Empirical studies have shown that firm-level fixed effects are important for the wage
differentials between male immigrants and male natives and attenuate the problem of
unobserved firm characteristics (Aydemir and Skuterud 2008), but the fixed effects esti-
mator does not address the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables. For sev-
eral reasons, the composition of a firm’s workforce is potentially endogenous: firstly,
the average wage offered by the firm might influence its attractiveness for workers, and
a relatively higher wage could attract workers with better unobserved skills; secondly,
shocks in productivity levels or wages might generate correlated changes in the firm’s
composition: for instance, in periods of cyclical downturn firms might lay off more im-
migrants than natives. In order to tackle both firm-fixed unobserved heterogeneity and
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potential endogeneity, we estimate all three equations using a GMM-IV specification in
first differences with instrumental variables (Black and Lynch 2001; Daerden et al. 2006).
We use two types of instruments. Following van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011) and Göbel
and Zwick (2012), the first type of variable instruments the first-differenced shares of im-
migrant workers with their lagged levels. The implicit assumption is that changes in wages
in one period, although possibly correlated with contemporaneous variations in the shares
of immigrant workers, are unrelated with lagged levels of the latter. Moreover, changes in
the shares of immigrant workers are assumed to be sufficiently correlated to their past
levels. The second instrument is the annual average share of immigrants in the sector in
which firm j operates.2 The rationale for this instrument is that sector shares can be
shown to be correlated with the proportion of immigrants in firm j while being unrelated
to the productivity of firm j and the error term (Garnero 2014).
In order to assess the soundness of this approach, we performed a range of statistical
tests. The first test measures whether the correlation between the instrumental vari-
ables and the endogenous variables is sufficiently strong, i.e. that the instruments are
not “weak”. For this purpose, we used the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. Under
the null hypothesis, the instruments are weak. A standard rule of thumb is to reject the
null hypothesis if the F statistic is at least 10 (van Ours and Stoeldraijer 2011). The sec-
ond test is the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, whose null hypothesis is that the equa-
tion is underidentified. The third test concerns the validity of the instruments and uses
the Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions. Under the null hypothesis, the in-
struments are valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term. A fourth indicator tests
whether the immigrant shares are indeed endogenous so that an IV approach is war-
ranted. Under the null hypothesis, the explanatory variables can actually be treated as
exogenous.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data set
Our empirical analysis is based on a combination of two large data sets spanning the
period 1999–2010. The first is the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). It covers all
firms operating in Belgium that employ at least 10 workers and with economic activ-
ities within sections C to K of the NACE nomenclature (Rev. 1). The survey contains a
wealth of information, provided by the human resource departments of firms, both on
the characteristics of the latter (e.g. sector of activity, number of workers, level of col-
lective wage bargaining) and on the individuals working there (e.g. age, education, gross
earnings, paid hours, gender, occupation, etc.).3 The SES provides no financial informa-
tion. Therefore, it has been merged with a firm-level survey, the Structure of Business
Survey (SBS). The SBS provides information on financial variables such as firm-level
added value and gross operating surplus per hour. The coverage of the SBS differs from
the SES in that it does not include the whole financial sector (NACE J) but only Other
Financial Intermediation (NACE 652) and Activities Auxiliary to Financial Intermediation
(NACE 67). The data collection and merger of the SES and SBS datasets has been carried
out by Statistics Belgium using firms’ social security numbers. The capital stock of each
firm has been calculated with the Permanent Inventory Method (PIM) using annual firm-
level information on gross fixed capital formation.
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Two filters have been applied to the original data set. Firstly, we deleted firms that
are publicly controlled and/or operating in predominantly public sectors from our sam-
ple. The rationale of this filter derives from standard productivity theory and the re-
quirement that prices have to be economically meaningful. All regressions are therefore
applied to privately controlled firms only.4 Secondly, in order to ascertain that firm av-
erages are based on a sufficient number of observations, we filtered out firms that pro-
vided information on less than 10 employees.5
Our final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 9430 firms and 555,963 individ-
uals, yielding 23,712 firm-year observations during the 12-year period (1999–2010). It
is representative of all medium-sized and large firms employing at least 10 employees
within sections C to K of the NACE Rev. 1 nomenclature, with the exception of large
parts of the financial sector (NACE J) and almost the entire electricity, gas and water
supply industry (NACE E).
4.2 Definition of main variables
Our earnings measure corresponds to total gross wages, including premia for overtime,
weekend or night work, performance bonuses, commissions and other premia. Work
hours represent total effective remunerated hours in the reference period (including
paid overtime hours). The firm’s added value per hour is measured at factor costs and
based on the total number of hours effectively worked by the firm’s employees. All vari-
ables in the SES-SBS are provided by the firm’s management and therefore more pre-
cise compared to self-reported employee or household surveys.
The OECD statistics on immigration we cited in the introduction define immigrants as
individuals who reside in a different country than the one in which they were born. For at
least three reasons, this is an imperfect indicator for the presence of immigrants on the
labor market. First, some of the “otherness” of foreign-born workers is erased through the
process of assimilation: an individual who was born abroad but who spent her entire adult
life in the host country is often so assimilated that she ceases to be an “immigrant” in the
eyes of her employer, co-workers and even herself. Second, the children of foreign-born
immigrants are by this definition not counted as “immigrants” even though they are often
perceived as such in their host society. Third, while all immigrants differ to some extent
from natives—even if only by the country of birth in their passport—some immigrants
differ more from natives than others: a German in Austria or a Frenchman in Belgium ar-
guably stands less out than a Turkish or a Moroccan.
In the literature on wage discrimination against immigrants, most studies
operationalize the distinction between immigrants and natives by using information on
the country of birth and/or the nationality of the individual. For instance, Böheim et al.
(2012, p. 15) distinguish between Austrian-born workers and those born in any other
country. The authors use country of birth rather than nationality on the grounds that
“ethnic background may be more relevant for productivity spillovers than citizenship”.
As argued above, the simple native-immigrant dichotomy is problematic because it
does not account for the unequal otherness of immigrants: for instance, it does not dis-
tinguish between the different socio-economic status of German and Turkish immi-
grants in Austria. Another problem with this definition is that “being an immigrant”
can be associated with both the country of birth and the nationality of an individual.
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For the case of Belgium, existing evidence suggests that we can address the problem
of heterogeneity among immigrants by distinguishing between individuals from the
European Union and those from outside of the EU. Martens et al. (2005) show that
workers born in Morocco and Turkey are underrepresented in high-wage jobs, whereas
those from Western or Northern Europe are not. Similarly, recent studies by the Insti-
tute for the Equality of Women and Men (2010, 2012) find that the distinction between
EU and non-EU workers is highly relevant for explaining wage differences in Belgium.
Moreover, using the criterion of EU membership has the advantage of higher policy
relevance than the simple native-immigrant dichotomy since immigration policy in EU
Member States cannot regulate the flow of workers with EU nationality due to the EU
Directive on the right to move and reside freely. A consequence of this Directive is that
Member States can only influence non-EU flows, for instance via quotas, visas and asy-
lum policies.
In this paper, we present results based on two mutually exclusive groups that define
immigrants as a combination of both nationality and country of birth. The first
group—“EU workers”—consists of individuals who were born in a Member State of the
European Union and with an EU nationality. EU membership evolved over time in suc-
cessive waves of accession. We show results based on EU-15 Member States, but our
results are robust to this choice due to the still relatively low share of workers from ac-
cession countries in Belgium. The biggest difference concerns Polish workers, who rep-
resent 2.8 % of non-EU individuals according to our EU-15 criterion and would be
counted as EU members with an EU-28 definition. Our baseline results are also robust
to using only country of birth or only nationality to define non-EU employees.
In our sample, 91.8 % of individuals are thus labeled as EU employees. Within this
group, individuals born in Belgium represent the largest share (93.9 %), followed by
France (1.7 %), Italy (1.5 %), Germany (0.8 %) and the Netherlands (0.7 %). The second
group—“non-EU workers”—consists of individuals who were either born outside of the
EU or with a non-EU nationality, which is the case for 8.2 % of observations. The most
frequent country of birth in this group is Morocco (21.3 %), Belgium (20.9 % of non-
EU workers were born in Belgium but with a non-EU nationality), Turkey (12.6 %),
Congo (7.7 %) and Serbia (4.1 %).
Male and female non-EU workers represent respectively 6.4 and 1.8 % of the sample
(35,690 and 9999 observations). This equals a gender ratio of 22 % among non-EU
workers and 27 % among EU workers. It should be noted that the relatively small share
of women in the sample is not a bias but merely reflects the fact that women are un-
derrepresented in the Belgian private-sector economy on which we focus in this paper.
4.3 Individual-level statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for EU and non-EU employees over the period
1999–2010. In order to examine gender differences within these two groups, we show
separate means for men and women. The average hourly wage is the highest for EU
men (16.3 euros) and lowest for non-EU women (13.4 euros). On average, EU women
and non-EU men earn roughly the same (around 14.25 euros). The average wage for
the entire sample is 15.6 euros and the average wage gap between immigrants and na-
tives 11 %; the immigrant-native gap is 14.8 % among men and 6.7 % among women.
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However, these averages mask the distribution of wages within each group. The density
plots in Fig. 1 show that the distribution of non-EU men and women (black curves) is
more compressed compared to EU workers (grey curves). Moreover, the density curves
of both EU and non-EU women (solid lines) peak at lower hourly wages compared to
Table 1 Sample means by foreigner status and gender (1999–2010)
Individual level Firm level





Wage/h (constant euros) 16.3 14.3 14.2 13.4 15.6 15.3
St. deviation (8.57) (8.08) (7.94) (7.83) (8.45) (5.47)
Worker characteristics
Education level 1 (ISCED 1–2) 35.7 26.7 50.7 35.8 34.5 34.0
Education level 2 (ISCED 3–4) 41.9 42.1 34.8 36.7 43.4 42.2
Education level 3 (ISCED 5–7) 22.4 31.2 14.4 27.5 24.2 23.8
Fixed-term contracts 2.5 4.0 5.5 8.2 3.1 3.1
High tenure (>5 years) 56.2 51.1 38.2 27.3 53.3 53.6
Workers <40 years 52.4 58.9 63.0 69.8 55.0 54.7
Occupations
Managers 4.3 2.4 2.1 1.8 3.7 3.8
Professionals 10.1 9.2 6.7 10.1 9.7 9.2
Technical ass. professionals 8.0 7.7 4.8 6.1 7.7 7.4
Clerical occupations 11.1 38.2 6.3 25.5 17.7 18.1
Service occupations 4.1 10.1 5.9 13.4 5.9 6.0
Crafts 31.0 10.9 32.9 10.0 25.8 27.1
Machine operators 23.1 10.8 21.9 7.1 19.7 19.0
Elementary occupations 8.2 10.8 19.4 26.1 9.9 9.4
Firm characteristics
Mining and quarrying 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Manufacturing 48.7 40.9 44.1 24.7 46.1 46.0
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Construction 15.2 3.1 15.6 1.9 12.0 13.2
Wholesale and retail trade 15.1 24.1 11.8 17.6 17.2 17.5
Hotels and restaurants 1.4 3.3 6.4 12.8 2.4 2.3
Transport, storage and communication 8.2 6.3 8.8 6.5 7.7 7.1
Financial intermediation 1.0 2.6 1.0 2.5 1.3 1.2
Real estate, renting and bus. services 9.9 19.4 12.1 33.7 12.8 11.8
Firm size 83.9 89.1 74.4 90.7 80.9 64.3
Added value/h (constant euros) 55.5 57.5 53.5 62.3 56.0 56.4
Firm-level collective bargaining 20.9 17.1 18.3 14.1 19.7 16.5
Region
Flanders 62.1 62.2 49.0 45.3 61.0 61.2
Brussels 11.6 16.2 26.8 36.4 14.2 13.2
Wallonia 26.3 21.6 24.1 18.3 24.9 25.6
Number of observations 373,728 136,546 35,690 9999 555,963 23,712
Share of sample (%) 67.2 24.6 6.4 1.8 100 100
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the curves of both male groups (dashed lines), but the curve for EU women (in grey)
lies above the curve for non-EU men (in black) for wages above 16 euros.
Table 1 underlines why it is important to take differences in human capital and sort-
ing into jobs, firms, sectors and regions into account. Indeed, the four groups under
analysis have distinct statistical profiles. Women in our sample are on average better
educated than men, although the difference between non-EU women and EU men is
only small. Non-EU men are by far the group with the lowest human capital from
schooling. Another indicator for human capital is labor market experience, which in
our data can be (imperfectly) proxied through the employee’s tenure with her current
employer. More than half of EU men and women have more than 5 years of experience
with their current employers, whereas this holds only for 38 % of non-EU men and less
than 30 % of non-EU women. Foreigners and natives also differ with respect to the type
of contracts on which they are employed: the proportion of fixed-term contracts is very
small among men from the EU (2.5 %) and 5.7 percentage points lower compared to
non-EU women.
The group of immigrants is on average younger compared to natives, with EU men
being the oldest and non-EU women the youngest group in the sample. The occupa-
tional distribution reflects both the gender dimension and immigrant status: both EU
and non-EU men are overrepresented in crafts and among machine operators. While
there are more EU men in managerial positions and among professional and technical
occupations, non-EU men are relatively more frequent in service and elementary occu-
pations. Women are overrepresented in clerical, service and elementary occupations,
whereas non-EU women are more concentrated in elementary and EU women in cler-
ical occupations. The biggest differences in the sectoral distribution of men and women
are found in the predominantly male construction sector; in the overrepresentation of
women in wholesale and retail trade as well as in real estate, renting and business ser-
vices. Immigrants are overrepresented in the hotel and restaurant sector. Non-EU
women are strongly underrepresented in manufacturing. Whereas foreign men work
on average for relatively small firms (measured in terms of the size of the workforce),
foreign women work in larger firms. Firm-level collective bargaining is more prevalent
in firms with a more masculine workforce: only 14 % of non-EU women are employed
Fig. 1 Distribution of hourly wages by immigrant status and gender
Kampelmann and Rycx IZA Journal of Migration  (2016) 5:15 Page 12 of 24
in firms that renegotiate wages through firm-level bargaining, a proportion that is 6.8
percentage points lower compared to EU men.
Finally, Table 1 shows the relative concentration of immigrants in the Brussels region
and their marked underrepresentation in Flanders.
A simple way to explore these descriptives is to apply the conventional method for
disentangling the productivity effects and wage discrimination by regressing human
capital and compositional characteristics on the logarithm of individual hourly wages.
In our sample, an OLS Mincer equation6 yields a coefficient of determination of 54 %
and a negative and significant coefficient for the non-EU dummy equal to −0.04, thus
suggesting that a non-EU worker whose observed characteristics are identical to a EU
worker suffers from a wage penalty of 4 %. This is in line with results from an Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition which indicates that around 77 % of the gross wage gap in our
sample can be attributed to observable differences. The highest contribution to the ex-
plained part in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition comes from individual and job char-
acteristics (60.1 % of the explained wage gap), while firm characteristics also matter
(31 %). Introducing interaction variables between immigrant status and gender im-
proves the fit of the OLS Mincer equation: the coefficient of determination rises by 3
percentage points and all three interaction variable are highly significant. Compared to
the reference group of EU men, the ceteris paribus wage penalty of non-EU men re-
mains at around 4 %. Women appear to suffer from relatively higher discrimination be-
cause the respective coefficients for non-EU and EU women are −0.15 and −0.14 (all
three interaction coefficients are significantly different from each other). As explained
above, however, these results suffer from severe methodological issues and need to be
complemented with more sophisticated identification techniques.
4.4 Firm-level statistics
Our identification strategy uses information on individual worker and job characteris-
tics with matched data on their employers, including average hourly productivity in the
firm.
While the composition of firms in terms of observable individual and job characteris-
tics does not differ substantially from the individual-level descriptive statistics (see last
column in Table 1), firm-level data allow to assess the distribution of EU and non-EU
workers across firms (Aydemir and Skuterud 2008). According to Mitaritonna et al.
(2014), insufficient attention has been paid to the large share of firms that do not hire
any immigrants. The highly unequal distribution that Mitaritonna et al. (2014) observe
in France echoes findings by Böheim et al. (2012: 15) for Austria suggesting that “the
employment of foreign workers is concentrated in few firms, about 50 % of firms em-
ploy less than 15 % of foreign workers and 10 % of firms employ more than 50 % of im-
migrant workers”. In line with these studies, immigrants are found in only 53 % of
firm-year observations in our sample from Belgium.7
The concentration of immigrants has been attributed to non-random sorting, for in-
stance due to network effects (Aslund and Skans 2010). Adding the gender dimension
to the analysis of non-random sorting sheds further light on the issue. In our sample,
the presence of non-EU men is positively correlated with the presence of non-EU
women (the corresponding significant pair-wise correlation coefficient is 0.15), whereas
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the share of both groups is negatively correlated to the share of EU men (the significant
correlation coefficients are −0.30 between non-EU and EU men and −0.42 between
non-EU women and EU men).
For our identification strategy based on Eqs. 1 and 2, the concentration of immi-
grants is potentially problematic if firms with no immigrants differ from the other firms
in terms of some unobserved characteristic that is correlated with differences in labor
productivity. In order to evaluate the relevance of this issue in our sample, we have es-
timated a logistic regression in which a dummy variable that equals 1 if there are any
immigrants in the firm is regressed on firm composition and firm characteristics. The
corresponding pseudo-coefficient of determination equals 8.5 % and the log pseudolike-
lihood −15003.8. Importantly, neither the coefficient for the average hourly productivity
nor the share of women in the firm is significantly correlated with the presence of im-
migrants in the firm. A significantly positive relationship is found for the regional dum-
mies for Brussels and Wallonia (in line with the higher presence of immigrants in these
regions compared to the reference region Flanders); the share of young workers; and
the size of the firm. The sectoral and occupational composition of the firm is not al-
ways significant in the logistic regression. As a consequence, immigrants do not appear
to be sorted according to differences in hourly productivity between firms, but rather
according to region, age and size, i.e. variables consistent with sorting according to net-
works (Dustmann et al. 2011).
Figure 2 shows the distribution of firms with respect to their respective shares of
male and female immigrants (the plot is restricted to the firm-year observations
employing any non-EU workers). We observe that both distributions are highly skewed
and illustrate that the vast majority of firms have less than 20 % of immigrants on their
payroll; only very few firms are composed of more than 40 % and virtually none of
more than 80 % of immigrants.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Baseline regressions
Regression results for the Bartolucci firm-level wage-setting model are presented in
Table 2. The first four columns show alternative specifications of a pooled OLS
Fig. 2 Distribution of immigrant shares by gender
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estimator in order to illustrate the impact of different forms of observed heterogeneity.
The wage gap between EU and non-EU employees is captured by the parameter γ. In
the first model without control variables, this corresponds to the gross wage differential
and is estimated to be −0.24, i.e. a 10 percentage point increase in the share of immi-
grants is on average associated with a 2.4 % decrease (=0.1*−0.24) of the average hourly
wage in Belgian firms. This effect collapses once we include observed individual and
job characteristics: the same increase in the immigrant share is now associated with an
insignificant decrease in average wages, whereas a 10 percentage point rise in the share
of female workers is related to a 1.9 % drop in wages. Segregation of workers across
sectors and regions affects the immigrant and female wage penalties only marginally
(column 3). The full-blown specification of Eq. 1 includes the average hourly productiv-
ity in the firm and other firm-level control variables (firm size, capital stock and level
of wage bargaining) on the right-hand side (column 4). The productivity parameter β is
positive and significant and the inclusion of observed firm characteristics increases the
coefficient of determination by 5 percentage points. However, the coefficient capturing
wage discrimination against immigrants remains insignificant, while the female wage
penalty is slightly reduced but remains high (the significant coefficient equals −0.17).
Table 2 Firm-level wage-setting equation without gender-immigrant interaction
Log av. hourly wage OLS OLS OLS OLS Fixed effects GMM-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




























Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual and job characteristicsb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectors and regionsc No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristicsd No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,712 23,712 23,712 23,712 23,712 8333




Weak identification testf 68.4
Overidentification testg 0.37
Endogeneity testh 0.54
Data source: SES-SBS 1999–2010; HAC standard errors in parentheses
***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10 % levels, respectively
aOmitted reference: share of EU workers
bIndividual and job characteristics include share of workers younger than 40 years, share of 8 occupational groups
(reference: service occupations); 3 educational levels (reference: ISCED 1–2); share of fixed-term contracts; share of
workers with more than 5 years of tenure
cSector and regional controls include 9 sectors (reference: manufacturing) and 3 regions (reference: Flanders)
dFirm controls include the logarithm of firm size, logarithm of capital and a dummy for firm-level collective bargaining.
All regressions include year dummies
eUnderidentifcation test reports p value of Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
fWeak identification test reports Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic
gOveridentification test reports p value of Hansen J statistic
hEndogeneity test shows probability that endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous
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The specifications in columns 5 and 6 take into account unobserved time-invariant
firm heterogeneity, i.e. some of the differences between firms that could be related to
hourly wages (and hourly productivity) and therefore bias the OLS results. The fixed ef-
fects model (column 5) shows a small and significant immigrant wage penalty (a 10
percentage point increase in the share of immigrants is associated with a 0.2 % decrease
in the average wage), and the wage coefficient of women is reduced by almost 50 % to
−0.09. Unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity appears to be highly correlated
with hourly labor productivity since the associated coefficient remains significant but
decreases to 0.01.8 The GMM-IV estimator (column 6) not only takes firm-level het-
erogeneity into account through its specification in first differences, but also addresses
the potential endogeneity of the firm’s labor force by using the lagged levels and aver-
age industry shares as instruments. Applying GMM-IV yields an insignificant wage
penalty for immigrants and a somewhat higher (and significant) wage penalty for
women (the corresponding coefficient equals −0.13). A series of statistical tests suggests
that our instruments are valid and that the model is correctly identified: the model
passes the tests for under-, weak- and overidentification. However, the endogeneity test
indicates that the potentially endogenous worker shares can actually be treated as ex-
ogenous (the p value equals 54 %), which means that the fixed effects model should be
preferred.
As argued in Section 3, the coefficients in the Bartolucci wage equation can be inter-
preted as productivity-adjusted measures of discrimination of certain groups of em-
ployees. Complementary evidence on this issue can be obtained by focusing on the
productivity effect of the share of foreigners in the conventional Hellerstein-Neumark
approach. Table 6 in the Appendix presents such productivity equations for OLS, FE
and GMM-IV estimators. While OLS coefficients suggest significantly negative effects
on productivity for both foreigners and women, the inclusion of time-invariant unob-
servable firm characteristics renders the coefficients insignificantly different from zero.
This corroborates the finding of the Bartolucci wage equation that some of the lower
pay received by foreigners and (especially) women is due to discrimination and not to
measurable differences in labor productivity.
5.2 Interactions between foreigner and gender variables
Table 3 reproduces Table 2 but the estimated models now allow for the respective ef-
fects of non-EU men, non-EU women and EU women to differ. Relative to the refer-
ence group of EU men, the significant gross wage differential in the parsimonious OLS
estimator (column 1) is the highest for non-EU men (a 10 percentage point increase of
this group is associated with a 2.9 % drop of the average firm wage), followed by non-
EU women (−1.2 %) and EU women (−0.8 %). This order arguably reflects both the
sorting of non-EU men into low-productivity firms and the fact that this group has the
lowest level of human capital (see Table 1). The order is indeed inverted once we con-
trol for observed individual and job characteristics (column 2). Segregation into sectors
and regions accounts for around 40 % of the gross wage penalty for non-EU women
(column 3), but is less consequential for non-EU men and EU women.
Adding average hourly productivity and firm-level characteristics to the model
slightly reduces the relative wage penalty for EU women (column 4). The GMM-IV
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estimator (column 6) again passes our identification tests but also rejects the endogeneity
of the worker shares so that the fixed effects estimator (column 5) is our preferred model.
It suggests that the ceteris paribus wage penalty is the highest for EU women (a 10 per-
centage point increase in EU women is associated with a 1 % lower hourly wage), followed
by the penalty for non-EU women (−0.6 %), but the difference between the two coeffi-
cients is not statistically significant. By contrast, the wage coefficient for non-EU men
equals −0.03 and is significantly lower compared to the penalty against EU women.
5.3 Institutional factors
We now turn to the results pertaining to the discussion of institutional factors in Sec-
tion 2.2.3. In order to assess the effect of collective bargaining regimes, Table 4 shows
the OLS, FE and GMM-IV estimators including all control variables for two sub-
samples: 19.803 firm-year observations in which no firm-level collective bargaining has
taken place and 3.909 observations with firm-level bargaining. Contrary to the estima-
tion results presented above, the GMM-IV estimator is the preferred specification for
Table 3 Firm-level wage-setting equation with gender-immigrant interaction
Log av. hourly wage OLS OLS OLS OLS Fixed effects GMM-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)










































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual and job characteristicsb No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectors and regionsc No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristicsd No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,712 23,712 23,712 23,712 23,712 8333




Weak identification testf 116.1
Overidentification testg 0.53
Endogeneity testh 0.52
Data source: SES-SBS 1999–2010; HAC standard errors in parentheses
***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10 % levels, respectively
aOmitted reference: share of male EU workers
bIndividual and job characteristics include share of workers younger than 40 years, share of 8 occupational groups
(reference: service occupations); 3 educational levels (reference: ISCED 1–2); share of fixed-term contracts; share of
workers with more than 5 years of tenure
cSector and regional controls include 9 sectors (reference: manufacturing) and 3 regions (reference: Flanders)
dFirm controls include the logarithm of firm size, the logarithm of capital and a dummy for firm-level collective
bargaining. All regressions include year dummies
eUnderidentifcation test reports p value of Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
fWeak identification test reports Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic
gOveridentification test reports p value of Hansen J statistic
hEndogeneity test shows probability that endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous
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the subsample without firm-level bargaining for which we cannot reject the hypothesis
of endogenous labor shares (the endogeneity test returns a p value of 0.06 against the
null hypothesis of exogenous regressors). For the other subsample, the FE estimators
remain the preferred specification.
The results provide some evidence for wage discrimination against foreigners in firms
without establishment-level collective bargaining: a 10 percentage-point increase is cor-
related with 2 % lower average wages in the preferred GMM-IV regression. By contrast,
the corresponding coefficient in the subsample with establishment-level collective bar-
gaining is not significantly different from zero. The difference between the two subsam-
ples with respect to the foreigner coefficient is statistically significant.
As for the coefficient related to the share of female employees, both subsamples dis-
play negative coefficients of roughly the same magnitude as in the baseline regression.
Comparing the preferred estimators, the difference between the two bargaining regimes
is not significant. Additional regressions including interaction variables between gender
and foreigner status (not shown here but available upon request) also confirm previous
results of wage penalties against both foreigners and women as well as the absence of
significant double discrimination against foreign women.
Table 4 Firm-level wage-setting equation according to level of collective bargaining
Without firm-level bargaining With firm-level bargaining
Log av. hourly wage OLS Fixed effects GMM-IV OLS Fixed effects GMM-IV





































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual and job characteristicsb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectors and regionsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristicsd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,803 19,803 5612 3909 3909 1508
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.29 0.71 0.31
Within R2 0.35 0.41
Between R2 0.60 0.64
Underidentification teste 0.00 0.00
Weak identification testf 24.1 24.5
Overidentification testg 0.48 0.52
Endogeneity testh 0.06 0.99
Data source: SES-SBS 1999–2010; HAC standard errors in parentheses
***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10 % levels, respectively
aOmitted reference: share of male EU workers
bIndividual and job characteristics include share of workers younger than 40 years, share of 8 occupational groups
(reference: service occupations); 3 educational levels (reference: ISCED 1–2); share of fixed-term contracts; share of
workers with more than 5 years of tenure
cSector and regional controls include 9 sectors (reference: manufacturing) and 3 regions (reference: Flanders)
dFirm controls include the logarithm of firm size and the logarithm of capital. All regressions include year dummies
eUnderidentifcation test reports p-value of Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
fWeak identification test reports Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic
gOveridentification test reports p-value of Hansen J statistic
hEndogeneity test shows probability that endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous
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The second factor discussed in Section 2.2.3 is firm size. Table 5 shows results for
two subsamples distinguishing the 11.927 firm-year observations below the median
firm size (“small firms”) from the 11.785 observations above the median (“big firms”).
In none of the two subsamples, we find evidence for endogenous regressors so that the
FE estimator is our preferred specification. Whereas the coefficient for the share of for-
eigners is not statistically different from zero in small firms, the estimation suggests
that a 10 % increase of foreigners is associated with 0.4 % drop of the average wage in
big firms. The difference between the two subsamples with respect to the foreigner co-
efficient is significant. Regarding the coefficients for gender, Table 5 again produces
similar results compared to the baseline specification and additional regressions with
interaction variables (not shown) provide no evidence for significant double discrimin-
ation of female foreigners.
6 Conclusions
This paper is one of the first to use firm-level matched employer-employee data and
direct information on wages and labor productivity to measure discrimination against
Table 5 Firm-level wage-setting equation according to firm size
Below median firm size Above median firm size
Log av. hourly wage OLS Fixed effects GMM-IV OLS Fixed effects GMM-IV





































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual and job characteristicsb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectors and regionsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristicsd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,927 11,927 1961 11,785 11,785 5997
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.21 0.71 0.31
Within R2 0.33 0.41
Between R2 0.51 0.64
Underidentification teste 0.00 0.00
Weak identification testf 22.9 103.6
Overidentification testg 0.22 0.01
Endogeneity testh 0.33 0.77
Data source: SES-SBS 1999–2010; HAC standard errors in parentheses
***, **, * significant at 1, 5 and 10 % levels, respectively
aOmitted reference: share of male EU workers
bIndividual and job characteristics include share of workers younger than 40 years, share of 8 occupational groups
(reference: service occupations); 3 educational levels (reference: ISCED 1–2); share of fixed-term contracts; share of
workers with more than 5 years of tenure
cSector and regional controls include 9 sectors (reference: manufacturing) and 3 regions (reference: Flanders)
dFirm controls include the logarithm of firm size, the logarithm of capital and a dummy for firm-level collective bargaining.
All regressions include year dummies
eUnderidentifcation test reports p value of Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
fWeak identification test reports Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic
gOveridentification test reports p value of Hansen J statistic
hEndogeneity test shows probability that endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous
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immigrants. We build on a recent identification strategy proposed by Bartolucci (2014)
and address econometric issues such as firm fixed effects and the potential endogeneity
of worker shares through a diff GMM-IV estimator. Our preferred estimator of a
Bartolucci-type wage-setting equation (the fixed effects model shown in column 5 of
Table 2) suggests that an increase in the share of non-EU workers in a firm is corre-
lated with a modest but significant decrease of the average wage paid in Belgian firms.
The wage coefficient associated with the share of women is also significantly
negative and three times higher compared to the wage discrimination against non-
EU workers. However, wage discrimination against immigrants is likely to interact
with gender discrimination—an important contribution of the paper is therefore to
estimate these interactions. Our preferred model including interactions between
gender and immigrant status (column 5 in Table 3) corroborates modest wage dis-
crimination against men of non-EU origin, but also shows that the wage discrimin-
ation against both native and foreign women is significantly higher. Results suggest
that origin is not associated with a significantly different wage penalty among
women: we therefore find evidence for significant wage discrimination against im-
migrants and women, but female immigrants do not appear to be exposed to
“double-discrimination” by employers in Belgium. This result stands up to a series
of tests, including measurement issues such as unobserved time-invariant firm het-
erogeneity, the potential endogeneity of the firm composition, but also to alterna-
tive definitions of the immigrant status and the reduction of our sample to firm-
year observations with at least one immigrant per firm.
We also test additional hypotheses regarding institutional factors that could influ-
ence the extent of wage discrimination against foreigners and/or women. The first
hypothesis relates to the role of the collective bargaining regime. We find evidence
that firm-level bargaining seems to eliminate the incidence of wage discrimination
against foreigners (see Table 4). This lends some support to the often expressed ar-
gument that trade unions strive to protect low-wage groups from unfair pay (cf.
Dell’Aringa et al. 2004), but also that this protection appears to be only effective at
lower levels of bargaining. In Belgium, virtually all firms are covered by national
and sectoral collective bargaining agreements, yet only those that engage in add-
itional renegotiation of wages within individual companies—which is the case for
around 16.5 % of the firms in our sample—seem to curb wage discrimination
against foreigners. The second hypothesis concerns the effect of firm size. Our re-
sults (Table 5) suggest that wage discrimination against foreigners is concentrated
in relatively large firms. This speaks against the capacity of more sophisticated hu-
man resource management practices, according to Lallemand and Rycx (2005) a
characteristic of large firms, to attenuate wage discrimination against foreigners. By
contrast, our results are in line with the generally observed high wage inequality in
big firms. It is also coherent with the explanation that larger firms harbor special
low-pay categories in which foreigners are clustered—a practice that was docu-
mented in the German manufacturing sector during the first wave of massive post-
war immigration (Swenson 1989; Kampelmann 2011) and that could have survived
in large firms until today. On any account, the regressions capturing specific insti-
tutional contexts corroborate significant and sizable discrimination against women
and the absence of significant double discrimination against foreign women.
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Due to the novelty of the approach, we can only compare our findings to results for
Germany by Bartolucci (2014), who also finds negative productivity-adjusted wage coef-
ficients for male and female immigrants as well as native women. The size of wage dis-
crimination found by Bartolluci is also relatively modest but somewhat higher
compared to our results: a 10 percentage point increase in the share of male immi-
grants is associated with a 1.3 % decrease in the average firm wage in Germany,
whereas we find a 0.2 % decrease for Belgium. Unlike our estimations, however, Bartolucci
(2014) finds evidence for double-discrimination against female immigrants in Germany (a
10 percentage point increase in female immigrants is associated with a 2.7 % lower aver-
age firm wage).
Our results suggest that not all of the observed wage differences between immi-
grants and natives are due to productivity differences (for instance due to lower
language skills)—despite Belgian’s strong anti-discrimination legislation, we find evi-
dence for wage discrimination against immigrants. The wage gap between women
and men can also not be reduced to productivity differences—and compared to the
native-immigrant gap there is arguably a lower theoretical case for productivity dif-
ferences between men and women to begin with. Interestingly, foreign women do
not cumulate the two wage penalties associated to gender and origin and receive
roughly the same wage penalty as native women. A possible explanation for this
phenomenon might by that origin is of lesser importance among women than
among men; indeed, the educational profile of women with foreign origin resem-
bles closely the one of native women. Moreover, certain institutional factors such
as firm-level collective bargaining and smaller firm sizes appear to attenuate wage
discrimination against foreigners, but not against women. Overall, our results sug-
gest that while wage discrimination against immigrants remains an issue on the
Belgian labor market, the magnitude of this discrimination is relatively small com-
pared to the discrimination against (native and foreign) women.
Endnotes
1For space reasons we do not reproduce the demonstration of these properties pro-
vided by Bartolucci (2014).
2The average is calculated excluding the firm j.
3The SES is a stratified sample. The stratification criteria refer respectively to the re-
gion (NUTS-groups), the principal economic activity (NACE-groups) and the size of
the firm. Sampling percentages of firms are respectively equal to 10, 50 and 100% when
the number of workers is lower than 50, between 50 and 99, and above 100. Within a
firm, sampling percentages of employees also depend on size. Sampling percentages of
employees reach respectively 100, 50, 25, 14.3 and 10% when the number of workers is
lower than 20, between 20 and 50, between 50 and 99, between 100 and 199, and be-
tween 200 and 299. Firms employing 300 workers or more have to report information
for an absolute number of employees. To guarantee that firms report information on a
representative sample of their workers, they are asked to follow a specific procedure.
For more details see Demunter (2000).
4More precisely, we eliminate firms for which public financial control exceeds 50 %.
This exclusion reduces the sample size by less than 2 %.
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5This selection is unlikely to affect our results as it leads only to a small drop in sam-
ple size.
6In addition to all variables shown in Table 1, the Mincer equations and Oaxaca-
Blinder decompositions discussed in this paragraph also include time dummies. De-
tailed results have been omitted for space reasons but can be requested from the
authors.
7Some of the firm-year observations without immigrants are from firms that employ
immigrants in other years, which is why we kept all observations in the sample used
for estimating Eqs. 1 and 2 (observations without immigrants are automatically
dropped for Eq. 3). This being said, the regression results for Eqs. 1 and 2 presented in
the next section are robust to the exclusion of the 47 % of firm-year observations with
no immigrants (excluding firms without immigrant leads to slightly higher coefficients
for all foreigner variables).
8Although smaller in size, the downward effect of firm fixed effects on the productiv-
ity parameter is also found in Bartolucci’s (2014) estimations based on hourly value
added in German firms.
Appendix
Table 6 Firm-level productivity equation
Log av. hourly value added OLS OLS OLS OLS Fixed effects GMM-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






















Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual and job
characteristicsb
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectors and regionsc No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristicsd No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,712 23,712 23,712 23,712 23,712 8333




Weak identification testf 68.4
Overidentification testg 0.82
Endogeneity testh 0.98
Data source: SES-SBS 1999–2010; HAC standard errors in parentheses
***, ** significant at 1, 5 and 10 % levels, respectively
aOmitted reference: share of EU workers
bIndividual and job characteristics include share of workers younger than 40 years, share of 8 occupational groups
(reference: service occupations); 3 educational levels (reference: ISCED 1–2); share of fixed-term contracts; share of
workers with more than 5 years of tenure
cSector and regional controls include 9 sectors (reference: manufacturing) and 3 regions (reference: Flanders)
dFirm controls include the logarithm of firm size, logarithm of capital and a dummy for firm-level collective bargaining.
All regressions include year dummies
eUnderidentifcation test reports p value of Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
fWeak identification test reports Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic
gOveridentification test reports p value of Hansen J statistic
hEndogeneity test shows probability that endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous
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